

a specialist in pursuit aviation, would relegate bombers to second place in favor of the manufacture and use of pursuit planes. However, subsequent reports state that the Germans have taken over complete control and command of the Italian Air Force because of [39] the sinking of the big convoy on November 3 when many German soldiers were drowned. Mussolini was said to have acquiesced to the German demand and, rather than submit, General Priolo resigned.

General Fougier is only a figure-head, and it is reported that he is not respected by the Air Force. He was a protégé and satellite of the late General Balbo and commanded the 3rd Italian Air Fleet.

EXHIBIT No. 58

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

Cinepac File No. A2-11/FF12
A16(1)/P16-3/(90) Serial 01353

Confidential

MAY 6, 1942.

PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL LETTER 23CL-42

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Battle Organization and Condition of Readiness Watches at Sea.

References: (a) Cinepac Conf. Ser. 0300 of 21 Feb. 1941.

(b) War Instructions—Chapter 8, Section 2.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (a).

1. Enclosure (A), which discusses in detail and sets forth the basic principles upon which conditions of readiness are established, is herewith issued to the Fleet.

2. With the personnel now on board ships of the Pacific Fleet, the proportion of the armament to be manned in the various types of vessels under the three conditions of readiness for action and based on the principles of enclosure (A) should be as follows:

CONDITION ONE

Type	Main battery	A. A. battery	Automatic weapons
BB.....	All	All	All
CV.....		All	All
CA.....	All	All	All
CL.....	All	All	All
DL.....	All		All
DD.....		All	All
DM & DMS.....	All		All
AUX.....	All	All	All

CONDITION TWO

BB.....	$\frac{1}{2}$	All	All
CV.....		All	All
CA.....	$\frac{1}{2}$	All	All
CL.....	$\frac{1}{2}$	All	All
DL.....	$\frac{1}{2}$		All
DD*.....		$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
DM & DMS*.....	$\frac{1}{2}$		$\frac{1}{2}$
AUX*.....	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$

CONDITION THREE

BB.....	None	All	$\frac{1}{2}$
CV.....		$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
CA.....	None	All	$\frac{1}{2}$
CL.....	None	All	$\frac{1}{2}$

*Three section organization. Conditions two and three identical.

3. Although the three conditions of readiness for action provide varying degrees of security, they were devised *primarily to preserve the fighting efficiency of the personnel* over extended periods of time.

4. Responsible Commanders are enjoined to keep the balance between security and rest and to choose that Condition of Readiness, even if it is in effect for only a short period, which will conserve to the maximum the energy and readiness of personnel for battle.

5. The War Instructions set forth the circumstances under which Condition Two is the appropriate Condition of Readiness to be maintained.

6. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet believes that with efficient Radar equipment and the security afforded by air and surface screening, Condition Three will normally meet security requirements when not in contact with the enemy.

C. W. NIMITZ.

Distribution: (21CM-42)

List II, Case 2, P, NTS, X, Z.

EN3, EN6, NB49,

ND11-15, NY8-10.

P. C. CROSLY,
Flag Secretary.

[1] Cincpac File No.
A16 P16-3 (0300)

UNITED STATES FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 21 February 1941.

Confidential

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To:

Commander Battle Force.
Commander Scouting Force.
Commander Base Force.
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.
Commander Minecraft, Battle Force.
Commander Battleships, Battle Force.
Commander Cruisers, Battle Force.
Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force.
Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force.
Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.
Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.

Subject: Battle Organization and Condition Watches.

1. The problem of battle organization and Conditions of Readiness for Action for all types in the Fleet is an acute one, requiring immediate and realistic solution. The Fleet at any moment may find itself faced with actual war conditions requiring a state of alertness and readiness, at sea and in port, not experienced since World War I and incompletely anticipated in the intervening years.

2. That our ships are properly organized for battle itself and personnel assigned to essential stations, especially in view of what has been revealed by the Fleet Personnel Board, is not questioned. However, the various Conditions of Readiness for Action based on these Battle Organizations need to be examined in the light of modern needs, and they are, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, susceptible of great improvement.

3. It is not desired to require rigid and detailed standardization of battle and condition watch bills for all types. But there is need of agreement in basic and fundamental principles, so that Fleet and Task Force Commanders may know what they are getting in the way of security, and in the way of rest for the crews of their ships, when they order any Condition of Readiness for Action.

4. Since under modern war conditions it is impossible to man continuously all battle stations without relief, except when battle is imminent or actually joined; since men without adequate rest are soon rendered unfit for battle; and since, however, each ship must at all times be prepared to meet a surprise attack, the three Conditions of Readiness for Action have been devised. One fundamental consideration is stressed—these conditions were devised as much to give men adequate rest as to keep all possible stations manned. If the sole requirement is to keep every station manned—to provide maximum security—there can be only one condition, Condition One. The object of the other conditions is to give the crews adequate rest, thereby bringing them fresh into battle, and at the same time to provide reasonable security. If in any Condition of Readiness, security becomes no longer reasonable and adequate, the next higher condition must be set. Operating, as we may soon have to operate, in a large theatre of war this delicate balance between security and rest must be carefully kept or we shall be worn out on the one hand or caught unware on the other.

5. The part that sound organization plays in this is to assign all men to their various stations under all three conditions, so that each man may know where he goes and when, in shifting from one of the conditions to another; to permit these shifts to be made without confusion; and to insure that the maximum number of essential stations is manned in each condition. What is desired is a division of labor to avoid exhaustion. If we considered Condition Watches as primarily involving men we shall get extra dividends in security by their efficient use.

[2] 6. An examination of the Type reports of the Fleet Personnel Board reveals that the complements recommended by that board permit the setting of a Condition Two Watch, except in destroyers and certain auxiliaries, meeting latest maximum requirements; also that even with complements less than those recommended, but equal to those provided for in the latest Fleet Operating Plan, a fully manned A. A. battery can be provided in that Condition. This arrangement is already in effect in the heavy and light cruisers. The Commander-in-Chief has therefore recommended a change in the War Instructions requiring all, instead of half, the A. A. battery being manned in Condition Two.

7. It follows that, if in Condition Two all of the A. A. battery can be manned, in Condition Three at least one half of this battery can be manned. This should be the minimum requirement for Condition Three. However, the number of men available in all large ships permits the manning of much more than half, and in some ships practically all, of the A. A. battery in this Condition on a basis of a watch in four. When this can be done a measure of security is obtained approaching that of Condition Two, insofar as the A. A. battery is concerned, without the undesirable watch and watch feature of that Condition. Over long periods such an augmented Condition Three Watch may not only be desirable but essential to prevent exhaustion of our men.

8. That the above cannot be accomplished without the use of main battery personnel is obvious. To man all A. A. guns in Condition Three without calling on all personnel already available will require more than a ship can carry. Not to man these guns to the fullest extent is to fail in providing every possible defense and to neglect a reservoir of men, who in that Condition, have no other duties to perform. It is not proposed to use main battery personnel when they are needed in the main battery, nor is it intended to place too much stress on A. A. protection to the detriment of main battery fire. But, when the situation at sea permits the setting of Condition Three or the situation in port requires the manning of A. A. guns only over long periods of time, to require the A. A. battery personnel to continue a watch in two on the one hand or to man a lesser number of guns on the other (while at the same time large numbers of main battery personnel are idle) is to fail in making efficient use of the men and material available. That this question is highly controversial is recognized. But the Commander-in-Chief fails to see how we can come to any other conclusion than to make full use of our men.

9. To insure the smooth functioning of condition watches requires strict adherence, in those ships carrying sufficient personnel, to the time honored quadrilateral organization of two watches and four sections. This is essential, and in no other way can the shift from one condition to another be accomplished without confusion and without the imposition of successive double watches on part of the personnel. In this connection the use of the terms

"Watch One" and "Watch Two", in lieu of Starboard and Port Watches, is not only confusing, since the sections are already numbered "one" to "four" inclusive, but it disguises the fact that these watches must actually be the starboard and port watches throughout the ship to make a watch in four work. This confusion already exists in some ships for sea watches; and will be further accentuated in all ships using this system, when Base Conditions of Readiness are established in port.

10. To permit the use of the basic four section arrangement, and the employment of the main battery personnel in Condition Three, requires the longitudinal division of main battery into starboard and port watches in Condition Two. This may be accomplished by having all turrets half manned, instead of half the turrets fully manned, in Condition Two; or it may be accomplished by having half the turrets fully manned in four turret ships; or in three or five turret ships by having one or two turrets fully manned and the odd turret half manned. Turrets fully manned should have the entire turret crew in the starboard or port watch and subdivided into only two sections. Turrets half manned should have the turret crew equally divided between the starboard and port watch. Of these systems the one should be adopted which will give the maximum return considering the material installations in the individual ships and the difficulty of getting men into the turret while the turret is being fired. The past practice in heavy cruisers of manning only one turret complete in Condition Two, thereby falling far short of the requirement of having one half the battery manned, is not approved.

11. The system of half manning all the turrets in Condition Two has been in effect in some heavy cruisers and all 10,000 ton light cruisers and has proved feasible. Indications are, since many of the installations in a triple turret are in duplicate rather than triplicate, that fire can be opened with all and continued with two-thirds, rather than one half, the battery until the off [3] watch responds to general quarters. A firing test, shortly to be conducted in Light Cruisers, should settle this question conclusively for that type.

12. Certain types, such as destroyers and some auxiliaries, and some activities in heavy ships, such as the M. E. and Radio Divisions, do not lend themselves to a four section arrangement. They have been organized on a three section basis, partly from long established custom and partly because enough qualified personnel cannot be carried to permit of a normal watch in four. When the latter is truly the case this situation should be recognized and accepted. When the A. A. battery is also the main battery, as in most destroyers, it is frequently impossible to man all this battery in Condition Two on a basis of a watch in two. If all the battery is required; Condition One must be set for its efficient service. However, it appears feasible to man half the battery efficiently on a basis of a watch in three. The logical solution in such cases is to make Conditions Two and Three identical—a straight watch in three.

13. The Commander-in-Chief desires that for all Types:

(a) Ships be organized on a strictly quadrilateral basis of two watches and four sections (straight three section basis for such destroyers and auxiliaries as cannot meet this requirement).

(b) In Condition Three one-fourth (or one-third where applicable) of the ship's company, less certain men such as cooks, bakers, mess attendants, etc., for essential services, be placed on watch.

(c) It be determined what essential stations can be manned by full and efficient use of one-fourth (or one-third) of the ship's company and report made to the Commander-in-Chief, so that the requirements for Condition Three can be changed in basic directives.

14. The Commander-in-Chief desires to impress upon Force and Type Commanders, in complying with paragraph 13, that the above sets forth principles which are to be followed and that departures in detail will be necessary. The end in view is a division of labor in order to avoid exhaustion.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Copy to:

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Compatwing TWO

P. C. CROSLY,

Flag Secretary.